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Abstract. The problem of forecasting conditional probabilities of the
next event given the past is considered in a general probabilistic setting.
Given an arbitrary (large, uncountable) set C of predictors, we would
like to construct a single predictor that performs asymptotically as well
as the best predictor in C, on any data. Here we show that there are
sets C for which such predictors exist, but none of them is a Bayesian
predictor with a prior concentrated on C. In other words, there is a
predictor with sublinear regret, but every Bayesian predictor must have
a linear regret. This negative finding is in sharp contrast with previous
results that establish the opposite for the case when one of the predictors
in C achieves asymptotically vanishing error. In such a case, if there is a
predictor that achieves asymptotically vanishing error for any measure
in C, then there is a Bayesian predictor that also has this property, and
whose prior is concentrated on (a countable subset of) C.
1 Introduction
The problem is probability forecasting in the most general setting. A sequence
x1, . . . , xt, . . . is generated by an unknown and arbitrary measure ν over the
space of all infinite sequences. Here for simplicity we consider xi coming from
a finite set X (since we are after a negative result, this is not a limitation),
but no other assumptions are made; in particular, xi may be dependent and the
dependence may be arbitrary. At each time step t a predictor ρ is required to give
the conditional probabilities ρ(xt+1|x1, . . . , xt) of the next outcome xt+1 given
the observed past, before xt+1 is revealed and the process continues. We would
like the predicted ρ probabilities to be as close as possible to the unknown ν
probabilities ν(xt+1|x1, . . . , xt). The difference is measured with respect to some
loss function L, which in this work we take to be the ν-expected average log
loss (see the definitions below); however, it is clear that the main result applies
more generally as well. Since ρ is required to give conditional probabilities given
every possible sequence of past outcomes, ρ itself defines a probability measure
over X∞, and thus predictors and environments (mechanisms generating the
data) are objects of the same kind.
To assist in the prediction task, we are given a set of predictors C. The perfor-
mance of our predictor ρ is compared to that of the predictors in C, on sequences
x1, . . . , xt . . . generated by an arbitrary and unknown measure ν. Thus, we are
interested in regret of using the predictor ρ as opposed to using the best (for
this ν) predictor from C. The question we pose is whether this can be achieved
by some kind of combination of predictors in C, or whether it may be necessary
to look elsewhere — outside of C (and its convex hull). More specifically, we are
asking the question of whether there exists a prior over C, such that the Bayesian
predictor with this prior has the smallest possible regret (at least, asymptotically)
with respect to the best measure in C. The answer we obtain is negative: there
are some classes C such that any Bayesian predictor has linear regret, while the
best possible predictor has sublinear regret. Note that an example of such a set
C is necessarily uncountable, since for a countable set C any prior with non-zero
weights results in a Bayesian predictor with at most constant (in time) regret
with respect to each predictor in C, and thus zero asymptotic average regret.
It is worth noting that the result is not about Bayesian versus non-Bayesian
inference; in fact, in the last section of the paper it is argued that the negative
finding applies not only to Bayesian predictors. Thus, the result means that in
some cases, given a set of predictors, to construct a predictor that performs as
close as possible to the best of them, one has to look elsewhere — somewhere
completely outside of C (and its convex hull).
Prior work. This is somewhat disturbing, since it contradicts both the intuition
acquired from the literature on less general cases, and the positive results in
related general settings. Specifically, the question has been studied extensively
for specific families C of predictors, as well as in the non-probabilistic setting
of prediction with expert advice. For specific families, the question dates back
to Laplace who considered it for the case when C is the set of all Bernoulli
i.i.d. measures, and, moreover, it is assumed that the measure ν to be predicted
belongs to C. The latter assumption means that the problem is in the realizable
case. The predictor suggested by Laplace is in fact a Bayesian predictor with the
uniform prior over the parameter space. Moreover, a Bayesian predictor (with
a different, Dirichlet, prior) is known to achieve optimal cumulative log loss in
the realizable case of this problem, and, more generally for the case when C is
the set of Markov processes of order k [4]. Bayesian predictors for a variety of
other families are widely used, and their optimality can be often established even
outside the Bayesian setting, including the settings where the measures to be
predicted are outside the predictor’s prior. For example, a Bayes mixture over
all finite-memory processes predicts also all stationary processes [5].
In the setting of prediction with expert advice, one is given a finite set C
of experts, and the predictor that competes with them is constructed that has
a small regret (see, e.g., [1] for an extensive overview). A typical construction
for such a combination of experts is obtained by attaching a weight to each
expert’s prediction, where the weight decreases exponentially with the loss ac-
cumulated — a construction that is clearly reminiscent of Bayesian updating.
In either setting, one is typically concerned with finite or countable classes,
or with some specific parametric families of experts. The general case of the pre-
diction problem has been formulated in [6], where it is shown that, if we are only
interested in the realizable case, that is, the measure ν to be predicted belongs
to C, then one can always do with a Bayes predictor. More precisely, if there is a
predictor ρ whose error asymptotically vanishes with t on every ν ∈ C, then there
is a Bayesian predictor (with a prior over a measurable subset of C) that also has
this property. Moreover, the prior can be always taken over a countable subset
of C. This is shown without any assumptions on C whatsoever; in particular, C
is not required to be measurable. The work [7] unifies the formulations of the
realizable and the non-realizable (expert advice) problems, and also formulates
the following semi-realizable problem to which the result of [6] is generalized:
now ν is allowed to be any measure such that there is a measure µ in C whose
error asymptotically vanishes on ν. Here, again, if anything works then there is
a prior such that a Bayesian predictor with this prior works as well. The present
work completes the picture (and answers an open question from [7]), showing
that, unlike the realizable and semi-realizable case, the fully non-realizable case
of the problem cannot always be solved by a Bayesian predictor.
The result of this work along with those cited above can be also put into the
perspective of classical results on the consistency of Bayesian inference. Thus,
in [2] it is shown that, roughly speaking, there may exist a prior with which a
Bayesian predictor is inconsistent. In the context of the realizable case of the
prediction problem, that is, if there is a consistent predictor, [6] shows that there
always exists a prior with which a Bayesian predictor is consistent. Here we show
that, in the nonrealizable case, there are cases where every Bayesian predictor
with every possible prior is far from being as close as possible to being consistent.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be a finite set (the alphabet). Denote X ∗ := ∪k∈NX k. The notation x1..T
is used for x1, . . . , xT . We consider stochastic processes (probability measures)
on (X∞,B) where B is the usual Borel sigma-field. We use Eµ for expectation
with respect to a measure µ.
The loss we use in this paper is the expected log loss, which can be defined
as the expected cumulative Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL divergence):
LT (ν, ρ) := Eν
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈X
ν(xt = a|x1..t−1) log ν(xt = a|x1..t−1)
ρ(xt = a|x1..t−1) ,
where ν, ρ are any measures over X∞. In words, we take the expected (over
data) cumulative (over time) KL divergence between ν- and ρ-conditional (on
the past data) probability distributions of the next outcome. The expected log
loss is easy to study because of the following identity
LT (ν, ρ) = −Eν log ρ(x1..T )
ν(x1..T )
, (1)
where on the right-hand side we have simply the KL divergence between mea-
sures µ and ρ restricted to the first T observations.
If we have two predictors µ and ρ, we can define the regret up to time T of
(using the predictor) ρ as opposed to (using the predictor) µ on the measure ν
(that is, ν generates the sequence to predict) as
RνT (µ, ρ) := LT (ν, ρ)− LT (ν, µ).
For a set of measures C one can also define the regret up to time T of ρ with
respect to C on ν as RνT (C, ρ) := supµ∈C R
ν
T (µ, ρ). For the case of a finite or
compact C one often seeks to minimize RνT (C, ρ). However, already for countably
infinite sets C it may not be possible to bound RνT (µ, ρ) uniformly over C. This is
why we will not make much use of RνT (C, ρ), but rather work with its asymptotic
version, defined as follows.
Define the asymptotic average regret as
R¯ν(µ, ρ) := lim sup
T→∞
1
T
RνT (µ, ρ),
and
R¯ν(C, ρ) := sup
µ∈C
R¯ν(µ, ρ).
Note that, since we are after a negative result, working with asymptotic quanti-
ties only is not a limitation.
3 Main result
Theorem 1. There exist a set C of measures and a predictor ρ such that for
every measure ν we have R¯ν(C, ρ) = 0, yet for every Bayesian predictor ϕ with
a prior concentrated on C there exists a measure ν such that R¯ν(C,ϕ) ≥ c > 0
where c is a (possibly large) constant. In other words, any Bayesian predictor
must have a linear regret, while there exists a predictor with a sublinear regret.
Remark 1 (Countable C). Note that any set C satisfying the theorem must nec-
essarily be uncountable. Indeed, for any countable set C = (µk)k∈N, take the
Bayesian predictor ϕ :=
∑
k∈N wkµk, where wk can be, for example,
1
k(k+1) .
Then, for any ν and any T , from (1) we obtain
LT (ν, ϕ) ≤ − logwk + LT (ν, µk).
That is to say, the regret of ϕ with respect to any µk is a constant independent
of T (though it does depend on k), and thus for every ν we have R¯ν(C,ϕ) = 0.
It is worth noting that the origins of the use of such countable mixtures for
prediction trace back to [9,8].
Before passing to the proof of the theorem, we present here an informal
exposition of the counterexample used in the proof and the idea why it works.
The example of the proof starts with taking a Bernoulli i.i.d. biased coin-
toss measure, say, the one with the parameter p = 1/3, denoted βp. Take then
the set S of sequences typical for this measure, that is, all sequences for which
the frequency of 1 is asymptotically 1/3. We are interested in a predictor that
predicts all measures concentrated on a single sequence from S, and we will
ignore all other possible ν. The set of measures C is constructed as follows. Take
any sequence x in S and define the measure µx as the one that behaves exactly
as Bernoulli 1/3 on this sequence x, and on all other sequences it behaves as
some fixed (deterministic) measure. In other words, we have taken a Bernoulli
1/3 measure and split it into all its typical sequences, continuing it with a fixed
arbitrary sequence everywhere else. Denote C the resulting set of measures. Note
that the original measure βp can be recovered with a Bayesian predictor from
the set S. Indeed, it is enough to take βp itself as a prior over S. Such a Baysian
predictor will then be as good as βp on any measure. Observe that for every
x1..T it puts the weight of about 2
−hpT on the set of sequences from S that start
with x1..T (where hp is the binary entropy for p = 1/3 of the example). The loss
it achieves on measures from S is thus hpT and this is, in fact, also the minimax
loss one can achieve on S. However, it is not possible to achieve the same loss
(and to recover βp) with a Bayesian predictor whose prior is concentrated on
the set C. The trouble is that each measure µ in C attaches already too little
weight to the sequence from S that it is based on. To be precise, the weight it
attaches is the same 2−hpT that the Bayesian predictor gives to the corresponding
deterministic sequence. Whatever extra prior weight a Bayesian predictor gives
will only go towards regret; it cannot give a constant weight to each measure
because there are uncountably many of them. In fact, the best it can do is give
another 2−hpT , which means that the resulting loss is going to be double the best
possible one can obtain on measures from S with the best possible predictor,
and, again, double of what one can obtain taking for each ν ∈ S the best µ ∈ C.
This results in linear regret, which is, as we show, is at least hp in asymptotic
average.
Proof. Let the alphabet X be ternary X = {0, 1, 2}. For α ∈ (0, 1) denote
h(α) the binary entropy h(α) := −α logα− (1− α) log(1− α). Fix an arbitrary
p ∈ (0, 1/2) and let βp be the Bernoulli i.i.d. measure (produces only 0s and 1s)
with parameter p. Let S be the set of sequences in X∞ that have no 2s and such
that the frequency of 1 is close to p:
S := {x ∈ X∞ : xi 6= 2∀i, and∣∣∣∣1t |{i = 1..t : xi = 1}| − p
∣∣∣∣ ≤ f(t) from some t on},
where f(t) = log t/
√
t. Clearly, βp(S) = 1.
Define the set DS as the set of all Dirac measures concentrated on a sequence
from S, that is DS := {νx : νx(x) = 1, x ∈ S}. Moreover, for each x ∈ S define
the measure µx as follows: µx(XT+1|X1..T ) = p coincides with βp (that is, 1
w.p. p and 0 w.p. 1 − p) if X1..T = x1..T , and outputs 2 w.p. 1 otherwise:
µx(2|X1..T ) = 1 if X1..T 6= x1..T . That is, µx behaves as βp only on the sequence
x, and on all other sequences it just outputs 2 deterministically. This means, in
particular, that many sequences have probability 0, and some probabilities above
are defined conditionally on zero-probability events, but this is not a problem;
see the remark in the end of the proof.
Finally, let C := {µx : x ∈ S}. Next we will define the predictor ρ that
predicts well all measures in C. First, introduce the measure δ that is going
to take care of all the measures that output 2 w.p.1 from some time on. For
each a ∈ X ∗ let δa be the measure that is concentrated on the sequence that
starts with a and then consists of all 2s. Define δ :=
∑
a∈X ∗ waδa, where wa
are arbitrary positive numbers that sum to 1. Let also the measure β′ be i.i.d.
uniform over X . Finally, define
ρ := 1/3(βp + β
′ + δ). (2)
Next, let us show that, for every ν, the measure ρ predicts ν as well as any
measure in C: its loss is an additive constant factor. In fact, it is enough to see
this for all ν ∈ DS , and for all measures that output all 2s w.p.1 from some
n on. For each ν in the latter set, from (2) the loss of ρ is upper-bounded by
log 3 − logwa, where wa is the corresponding weight. This is a constant (does
not depend on T ). For the former set, again from the definition (2) for every
νx ∈ DS we have (see also Remark 1)
LT (νx, ρ) ≤ log 3 + LT (νx, βp) = Thp + o(T ),
while
inf
µ∈C
LT (νx, µ) = LT (νx, µx) = Thp + o(T ).
Therefore, for all ν we have
RνT (C, ρ) = o(T ) and R¯
ν(C, ρ) = 0.
Thus, we have shown that for every ν ∈ S there is a reasonably good predictor
in C (here “reasonably good” means that its loss is linearly far from that of
random guessing), and, moreover, there is a predictor ρ whose asymptotic regret
is zero with respect to C.
Next we need to show that any Bayes predictor has 2Thp + o(T ) loss on
at least some measure, which is double that of ρ, and which can be as bad as
random guessing (or worse; depending on p). We will show something stronger:
any Bayes predictor has asymptotic average loss of 2Thp on average over all
measures in S. So there will be many measures on which it is bad, not just one.
Let ϕ be any Bayesian predictor with its prior concentrated on C. Since
C is parametrized by S, for any x1..T ∈ X T , T ∈ N we can write ϕ(x1..T ) =∫
S
µy(x1..T )dW (y) whereW is some measure over S (the prior). Moreover, using
the notation W (x1..k) for the W -measure of all sequences in S that start with
x1..k, from the definition of the measures µx, for every x ∈ S we have∫
S
µy(x1..T )dW (y) =
∫
y∈S:y1..T=x1..T
βp(x1..T )dW (y) = βp(x1..T )W (x1..T ).
(3)
We will consider the average
EU lim sup
1
T
LT (νx, ϕ)dU(x),
where the expectation is taken with respect to the measure U defined as the
measure βp restricted to S; in other words, U is approximately uniform over this
set. Fix any νx ∈ S. Observe that LT (νx, ϕ) = − logϕ(x1..T ). For the asymptotic
regret, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the loss LT (νx, ϕ) is upper-bounded, say, by
T log |X | at least from some T on (for otherwise the statement already holds for
ϕ). This allows us to use Fatou’s lemma to bound
EU lim sup
1
T
LT (νx, ϕ)
≥ lim sup 1
T
EULT (νx, ϕ) = lim sup− 1
T
EU logϕ(x)
= lim sup− 1
T
EU log βp(x1..T )W (x1..T ), (4)
where in the last equality we used (3). Moreover,
− EU log βp(x1..T )W (x1..T )
= −EU log βp(x1..T ) + EU log U(x1..T )
W (x1..T )
− EU logU(x1..T ) ≥ 2hpT + o(T ),
(5)
where in the inequality we have used the fact that KL divergence is non-negative
and the definition of U (that is, that U = βp|S). From this and (4) we obtain
the statement of the theorem.
Finally, we remark that all the considered measures can be made non-zero
everywhere by simply combining them with the uniform i.i.d. over X measure
β′, that is, taking for each measure ν the combination 12 (ν + β
′). This way all
losses up to time T become bounded by T log |X | + 1, but the result still holds
with a different constant. ⊓⊔
4 Discussion
We have shown that there are sets of predictors whose performance cannot be
combined using any Bayesian predictor. While the result is stated for Bayesian
predictors and for log loss, the example used to establish it seems to apply more
generally. Indeed, it is clear that changing the loss won’t change the result, only
making the analysis slightly more cumbersome. More generally, the reason why
any Bayesian predictor does not work in this example is that, since the set C
considered is large, the predictor has to attach a quickly decreasing weight to
each element in C, whereas each measure in C already attaches too little weight
to the part of the event space of interest. In other words, the likelihood of the
observations w.r.t. each predictor in C is too small to allow for any penalty. To
combine predictors in C one has to boost the likelihood, rather than attach a
penalty. Doing something like this would of course break a predictor on other
sets C. This applies not only to Bayesian prediction. In fact, whatever general
prediction principle one could consider, for example, the MDL principle (see,
e.g., [3]), it appears to fail on the example presented. The same concerns expert-
advice-style predictors. The problem, therefore, seems to be generic: to combine
the predictive power of the predictors in the set, it is not enough to consider
combinations of these predictors; rather, one has to look somewhere completely
outside of C.
This suggests a more general question of how one can characterize those sets
C of predictors for which it is enough to consider only the predictors inside C
in order to effectively compete with them, as well as what can one do when this
is not the case.
As far as prediction in the realizable case is concerned (i.e., ν ∈ C, or, more
generally, zero regret is possible), the following question remains open. It is
shown in [6] that in this case, if any predictor works then there is a prior such
that a Bayesian predictor with this prior works as well. However, this result is
asymptotic. One can ask the question of whether the speed of convergence of
the loss (to 0 in this case) can be matched by some Baysian predictor, if any of
the measures in C is chosen to generate the data.
Another generalization is to the case when the best achievable regret is linear,
either in the realizable case or in the non-realizable one. Thus, the set C of
predictors may be so large that no predictor can have a sublinear regret. We still
would like to have as small regret as possible with respect to this set. Since the
set C is larger, the realizable case becomes more interesting. Can the smallest
regret still be achieved with a Bayesian predictor?
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